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THE DIVORCE REFORM LAW-
A LESSON IN LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
EDWIN H. WOLF*
W hen, in 1966, divorce reform became a reality in New York, di-
vorce and separation procedures were thought to be greatly simpli-
fied as a consequence of the increased attainability of both actions.
However, one corresponding aspect of divorce and separation, namely
the availability to the defendant of affirmative defenses in separation
and divorce actions, became unclear as a result of the legislative revi-
sion. This article is aimed at pointing up a perceived inconsistency in
New York's separation statute. The situation presented in this article
could arise in New York under the Domestic Relations Law. If the
matter has been before the courts, the author is unaware of it. If it
has not been before the courts, that is the good fortune of attorneys in
general. The situation is based on facts created by the author and any
resemblance to an actual case is coincidental.
Plaintiff commenced an action for a separation alleging cruel and
inhuman treatment.' The summons stated that the relief sought in-
cluded alimony, custody of children, support for the children, posses-
sion of the marital residence, and counsel fees. After following the
statutory reconciliation procedure,2 a final report and certificate of
no necessity or no further necessity for conciliation procedures was
issued.3 Subsequently, a complaint was served and issue joined.4 The
complaint alleged various and sundry times and events of cruel and
inhuman treatment.5 The answer consisted of a general denial of the
* Member, New York Bar. B.E.P., Cornell University, 1956; J.D., State University
of New York at Buffalo, 1970.
1. Cruel and inhuman treatment has long been a recognized ground for marital
separation agreements in New York. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 200(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1971).
2. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 215-c (McKinney Supp. 1971), provides:
a. Within twenty days after the commencement of a matrimonial action
the party plaintiff in such action shall file with the conciliation bureau
in the judicial district where the action is pending, a notice of commencement
of such action....
b. Upon the filing of such notice, the appropriate supervising justice shall
assign the matter to a conciliation commissioner.
3. N.Y. Domx. REL. LAw § 215-c(b) (4) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
4. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
5. N.Y. Civ. Ptac. LAW § 3016(c) (McKinney 1964). See also Mordkowitz v.
Mordkowitz, 13 Misc. 2d 495, 177 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Maas v. Maas, 5
Misc. 2d 840, 161 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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allegations. After examinations before trial a note of issue was filed.
Some months thereafter, defendant moved to serve a supplemental an-
swer pursuant to section 3025 (b) of the Civil Practice Laws and Rules,
7
which answer sought to allege the misconduct of plaintiff as an affirma-
tive defense to the action for separation and as a basis for asking the
court to exercise its discretion in denying the request for alimony. The
legal question thus presented is whether misconduct is (or should be)
an affirmative defense to an action for separation based on cruel and
inhuman treatment." .
. If plaintiff had sought a divorce, the answer would have been evi-
dent under current decisional law. Prior to 1967 the New York divorce
law allowed adultery as the only basis for divorce. Section 171 set. out
defenses to such an action for divorce, as follows:
In either of the following cases, the plaintiff is not entitled to
a divorce, although the adultery is established:
1. Where the offense was committed by the procurement or with
the connivance of the plaintiff.
2. Where the offense charged has been forgiven by the plaintiff.
The forgiveness may be proven, either affirmatively, or by the volun-
tary cohabitation of the parties with the knowledge of the fact.
3. Where there has been no express forgiveness, and no volun-
- tary cohabitation of the parties, but the action was not commenced '
within five years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the offense
charged.
4. Where the plaintiff has also been guilty of adultery under such
circumstances that the defendant would have been entitled, if inno-
cent, to a divorce.9
In: 1966 the divorce reform law extended the availability of divorcein
New York by creating the so-called "non-fault" grounds.'0 Although
section 171 was purportedly repealed in the title of the revising statute,
the text was retained." Therefore, the courts were left to decide whether
adultery would be a defense in an action for divorce on these newly
established grounds.
6. See, e.g., Augustin v. Augustin, 277 App. Div. 777, 97 N.Y.S.2d 430 (2d.Dep't
1950) on the limits of such examinations before trial.
7. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3025(b) (McKinney 1964).
8. Under the old separation law, see Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 28 Misc. 2d 922, 216
N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Feix v. Feix, 100 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
9. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 171 (McKinney 1964).
10. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1971). See the text of section
170 at note 21 infra.
11. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254.
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In Mante v. Mante,12 a wife brought an action for a divorce, alleg-
ing cruel and inhuman treatment. The lower court dismissed the action
for failure of proof, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In comment-
ing on several findings of the trial term, the Appellate Division noted:
Under the statute in effect prior to September 1, 1967, an action for
a divorce could be resisted by proof of adultery on the part of the
complainant; misconduct in general was not a defense .... That
statute remains unchanged by the revision. The present statute pro-.
viding for cruel and inhuman treatment as a ground for a divorce
therefore does not include the defense of recrimination based on
misconduct.'
3
Continuing, the court added:
In the light of this background, we think that adultery remains
the only misconduct which is a recriminatory defense to an action
for divorce; and then only if the plaintiff is proceeding in the action on
the theory of the defendant's adultery. No longer is fault an essential
component for divorce .... 14
Noting that the divorce reform law did not provide defenses to the
new grounds, the court concluded that the legislature intended to
abandon the traditional fault approach in divorces and to permit
termination of a marriage where both parties were at fault, except in
cases where both were guilty of adultery. In support of this position,
the court cited Gleason v. Gleason.'5
The same result has been reached in other cases. In Bishop v.
Bishop, ( a wife sought a divorce based on the ground of cruelty. Her
husband's answer denied the cruelty and included a counterclaim and
affirmative defenses. The court stated:
There are no statutory defenses to an action for divorce based on
the defendant's cruel and inhuman treatment. Defense must con-
sist of a denial of the complaints made. The sole statutory provision
relating to affirmative defenses for divorce actions is expressly limited
to actions based on adultery.
17
In Garner v. Garner,8 the same result was found when an action
12. 34 App. Div. 2d 134, 309 N.Y.S.2d 944 (2d Dep't 1970).
13. Id. at 139, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
14. Id. at 140, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
15. 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
16. 62 Misc. 2d 436, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
17. Id. at 437, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
18. 59 Misc. 2d 29, 297 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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based on the husband's confinement in prison for three consecutive
years after the marriage was defended on the basis of adultery.
The Mante case contains a good discussion of the limited defenses
available in actions for divorce. 19 The defense of recrimination has
been widely criticized and invariably limited to actions based on adul-
tery. The consistent view of courts in states where recrimination is per-
mitted as a defense has been that it is permissible only in an action
based on adultery.2
0
Thus it is clear that the sole affirmative defense to actions for
divorce is adultery and then only if the action is based on adultery.
Since fault is no longer an "essential component for divorce," the
lesser forms of recriminatory misconduct cannot frustrate an action
for divorce based on the other grounds such as cruel and inhuman
treatment.
Section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law, which sets forth the
grounds for divorce,21 contains no defenses in its text. The legislature
19. See Mante v. Mante, 34 App. Div. 2d 134, 139-41, 309 N.Y.S.2d 944, 949-51
(2d Dep't 1970).
20. See generally H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DOxESTIa RELATIONS 375 (1968).
21. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1971) states:
An action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure
a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant such
that the conduct of the defendant so endangers the physical or mental wel-being
of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to cohabit
with the defendant.
(2) The abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant for a period of one
or more years.
(3) The confinement of the defendant in prison for a period of three or more
consecutive years after the marriage of plaintiff and defendant.
(4) The commission of an act of adultery, provided that adultery for the
purpose of articles ten, eleven, and eleven-A of this chapter, is hereby defined
as the commission of an act of sexual or deviate sexual intercourse, voluntarily
performed by the defendant, with a person other than the plaintiff after the
marriage of plaintiff and defendant. Deviate sexual intercourse includes, but
not limited to, sexual conduct as defined in subdivision two of section 130.00
and subdivision three of section 130.20 of the penal law.
(5) The husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to a decree or judgment
of separation for a period of one or more years after the granting of such decree
or judgment, and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff that
he or she has substantially performed all the terms and conditions of such
decree or judgment.
(6) The husband and wife have lived separate and apart pursuant to a written
agreement of separation subscribed by the parties thereto and acknowledged
or proved in the form required to entitle a deed to be recorded, for a period of
one or more years after the execution of such agreement and satisfactory proof
has been submitted by the plaintiff that he or she has substantially performed
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enacted a separate section, section 171, to enumerate the defenses to
an action for divorce-defenses available only in an action based on
adultery.22 Emulating section 170, section 200 of the Domestic Rela-
tions Law outlines the statutory grounds for separation.23 Subsection 4
of section 200 provides:
The commission of an act of adultery by the defendant; except where
such offense is committed by the procurement or with the connivance
of the plaintiff or where there is voluntary cohabitation of the parties
with the knowledge of the offense or where action was not com-
menced within five years after the discovery by the plantiff of the
offense charged or where the plaintiff has also been guilty of adultery
under such circumstances that the defendant would have been entitled,
if innocent, to a divorce, provided that adultery for the purposes of
this subdivision is hereby defined as the commission of an act of sexual
or deviate sexual intercourse, voluntarily performed by the defendant,
with a person other than the plaintiff after the marriage of plaintiff
and defendant.
24
As indicated by the italicization, this subsection embraces all of the
defenses contained in section 171. The remaining portions of section
200 make no mention of defenses to the grounds for separation other
than adultery. In other words, it is apparent that one section, section
200, is intended to provide both grounds and defenses for separation
actions in the same way that two sections, sections 170 and 171, do for
divorce actions. There being no defenses to an action for divorce based
on the non-fault grounds, it logically follows that there exist no de-
fenses in an action for separation based on non-fault grounds. Such a
conclusion is seemingly consistent with the drafting of section 200,
especially in light of section 200 (4). However, one must consider the
effect of section 202, which states:
The defendant in an action for separation from bed and board may
set up, in justification, the misconduct of the plaintiff; and if that
all the terms and conditions of such agreement. Such agreement shall be
filed in the office of the clerk of the county wherein either party resides. In
lieu of filing such agreement, either party to such agreement may file a mem-
orandum of such agreement, which memorandum shall be similarly subscribed
and acknowledged or proved as was the agreement of separation and shall
contain the following information: (a) the names and addresses of each of the
parties, (b) the date of marriage of the parties, (c) the date of the agree-
ment of separation and (d) the date of this subscription and acknowledgment
or proof of such agreement of separation.
22. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 171 (McKinney 1964).
23. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 200 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
24. Id.
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defense is established to the satisfaction, of the court, the defendant
is entitled to judgment.
25
Prior to 1967, adultery was the only ground for divorce, while sev-
eral bases were available for separation. Accordingly, section 171 per-
mitted one defense, adultery, to an action for divorce, while section 202
permitted the broader defense of misconduct to an action for separation.
The number of defenses may have been the quid pro quo to the num-
ber of grounds. The divorce reform law increased the number of
grounds for divorce, but did not increase the number of defenses. If
section 202 is literally applied despite the revision of section 200, there
will be be no quid pro quo; that is, a defense will be available for each
ground in a separation action while the same defense is unavailable for
the corresponding ground in a divorce action. Although section 202
of the Domestic Relations Law states that misconduct of the plaintiff
will be a defense in an action for separation, it is difficult to conceive
that in the revision of section 200 the legislature intended all de-
fenses to apply to actions for separations on each ground when it limited
the defenses in actions for divorce to that of adultery in an action based
on adultery. If section 202 serves to bar plaintiff's action for a separa-
tion on defenses which would not be available in an action for di-
vorce, the result might depend solely on the relief sought. Such a result
would be inconsistent with the interpretation given in actions for
divorce. If a marriage can be terminated in a divorce action based on
non-fault grounds even though the plaintiff may be guilty of miscon-
duct, what sense can there be in preserving the marriage by denying a
separation on the basis of misconduct which would not be permitted in
a divorce action?
The absurdity of permitting misconduct as a defense in an action
for separation on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment is aptly
discussed in Woicik v. Woicik.26 In Woicik, the husband sued for a
divorce or separation charging cruel and inhuman treatment. De-
fendant counterclaimed for separation, charging cruel and inhuman
treatment and abandonment. At the close of the case, plaintiff moved
to withdraw so much of his prayer for relief as sought a separation.
The court found that the proof amply demonstrated the substance of
the charges of cruel and inhuman treatment made by each of the par-
ties. Since plaintiff had demonstrated the cruel and inhuman conduct
25. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 202 (McKinney 1964) (emphasis added).
26. 66 Misc. 2d 357, 321 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
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of the defendant, he was entitled to a divorce. The court went on to
discuss the anomalies of the Domestic Relations Law in the area of de-
fenses. It correctly stated the law in actions for divorce discussed previ-
ously and noted the difference in an action for separation because of
section 202. Although the court did not decide the applicability of
section 202 in light of the revision of section 200 under the divorce
reform law, it struggled with the problem in the context of alimony.
Had the defendent sued for divorce, she would have been en-
titled to a decree granting her the relief sought, regardless of whether
the doctrine of comparative rectitude or dual divorce were applied,
albeit the plaintiff would have been entitled to the same relief. If
this were the situation, there would have been no refusal "to grant
the relief requested by the.wife." Thus, despite the implication in Fos-
ter and Freed to the contrary (The Divorce Reform Law, 1970, p. 13),
the condition mandating the refusal to grant alimony would not exist.
Indeed, authority supports the conclusion that alimony would be justi-
fied, dependent on the need therefor (DeBurgh v. DeBurgh .... ) .That
case holds ... that "when a divorce is granted to both, alimony may
be awarded to either, for the basis of liability for alimony is the
granting of a divorce against the person required to pay it." ...
While there is no authority in this State which is directly in
point, Sacks v. Sacks ... is persuasive that the question of alimony
must be viewed as a unitary part of the question presented for de-
termination. There, the husband sued for separation. The wife counter-
claimed for like relief. Both claims were dismissed, the wife's for failure
of proof, and the husband's even though he established the wife had
abandoned him, because his conduct was such as to bar the relief.
sought. In affirming the substantial award of alimony the court
said... : "As a wife may obtain support from her husband when both
are free of misconduct, she may also obtain support when both are
guilty of misconduct which bars both from obtaining a separation."
Thus far we have discussed defendant's right to alimony in the
context of the hypothesis of a prayer seeking divorce. The fact is that
she has not sought a divorce; and the relief requested, in the form of
a separation, is denied on two grounds-recrimination and a termina-
tion of the marital relationship by the granting of a divorce to her
husband. However, rights are contingent upon the facts as they have
been developed upon the trial. It is difficult to believe that the Legis-
lature intended that a right so substantively vital as the right to ali-
mony be dependent upon a matter so substantively irrelevant as the
prayer for relief.
2 7
No doubt the court was correct in its conclusion. Paraphrasing the
27. Id. at 360-61, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10.
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last sentence requires the same conclusion in regard to the defense of
misconduct. It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended that
the defense of misconduct to an action should be "dependent upon a
matter so substantively irrelevant as the prayer for relief."
The defense of misconduct under section 202 should not be per-
mitted in a separation action when it is unavailable in a divorce ac-
tion. To allow such a defense would defeat the purpose of the reforms
and make it more difficult to obtain a separation than a divorce.
The situation need not arise in the context presented. The reader
can undoubtedly conceive of several others with little difficulty. One
example would be when the plaintiff seeks to amend the prayer for
relief from a separation to a divorce. Formerly, such motions were
granted because the rules of pleading were liberal, because there was
no prejudice to defendant, and the burden of proof for plaintiff was
equal or greater after the change in relief. Now, however, the granting
of such a right to amend precludes all defenses (except in an action
based on adultery) and, therefore, may prejudice a defendant who
wishes to defend. The alternative is for the plaintiff to discontinue the
action for separation and commence a new one for divorce, all of which
is an unnecessary technical procedure requiring the expenditure of
time and effort for lawyers, clients and the courts. Does it make sense
to preserve the marital status of the parties in a separation action be-
cause of the misconduct of the plaintiff when the same plaintiff could
terminate that status if the action were for divorce? I think the answer
to both questions is clearly "no." As Judge Fuld put it so aptly in
Gleason v. Gleason,28
In a word, if there is no longer a viable marriage the question of
fault, of "guilt," or "innocence," is irrelevant.29
28. 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
29. Id. at 35, 256 N.E.2d at 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
